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MEASURING LIVES UNDER WAIT-AND-SEE VERSIONS
OF THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the late seventeenth century,' the common-law rule against
perpetuities has provided that "no interest 2 is good3 unless it must
vest,4 if at all, not later than twenty-one years5 after a life in being6 at
1. The modem rule against perpetuities originated in the Duke of Norfolk's Case, 22 Eng.
Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682), rev'd, 22 Eng. Rep. 963 (Ch. App. 1683), rev'd, 22 Eng. Rep. 963 (H.L. 1683).
On the historic development of the rule, see J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 123-
200 (4th ed. 1942); R. MAUDSLEY, THE MODERN LAW OF PERPETUITES 29-35 (1979); 5 R. Pow-
ELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 759-60 (P. Rohan rev. 1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY, DONATrVE TRANSFERS 5-9 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1979) [hereinafter cited as RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND)]; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY 2123-29 (1944) [hereinafter cited as RESTATE-
MENT]; L. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 225-58 (2d ed. 1966); L. SIMES
& A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTuRE INTERESTS §§ 1211-21 (2d ed. 1956); Leach & Logan, The
Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities, in 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.4 (A.J. Casner ed.
1952). Cf. Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand- Rtflections on the Origins ofthe Rule
Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 19 (1977) (setting forth revisionist analysis).
2. "No interest," however, does not include rights of reentry and possibilities of reverter,
which were never subject to the common-law rule. See W. BuRBY, HAND BOOK OF THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY 420 (3d ed. 1965); J. GRAY, supra note 1, at §§ 299-313; 5 R. POWELL, supra note
I, at 769; RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 372; L. SiMES, supra note 1, at 280-81; L. SIMES & A.
SMITH, supra note 1, at §§ 1238-39; Leach & Logan, supra note 1, at § 24.62. Cf. R. MAUDSLEY,
supra note 1, at 71 (some rights of reentry subject to rule).
3. The penalty for violating the Rule is, by classical doctrine, to strike down the whole
interest-and often other interests as well, under the principle of infectious invalidity.
The penalty is inflicted, mind you, not on the testator or settlor, but on the innocent
intended beneficiaries. If the courts wish to be punitive in this matter, let them order the
corpse of the testator disinterred and dishonored as in the cases of Cromwell and Stalin,
but why do in the bereaved families?
Leach, Perpetuities: What Legislatures, Court, and Practitioners Can do About the Follies of the
Rule, 13 U. KAN. L. REv. 351, 351 (1965). See generally L. SImES & A. SMITH, supra note 1, at
1256-64; Leach & Logan, supra note 1, at §§ 24.47-.54.
4. For a discussion of the "polysemantie" character of the term "vest" as used in the law of
property, see W. LEACH & J. LOGAN, CASES AND TEXT ON FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE
PLANNING 253-54 (1961); Becker, Future Interests and the Myth ofthe Simple Wil: An Approach to
Estate Planning, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 607, 624-30:
For purposes of the rule against perpetuities, an interest is "vested" when:
a. any condition precedent attached to the interest is satisfied, and
b. the taker is ascertained, and
c. where the interest is included in a gift to a class, the exact amount or fraction to be
taken is ascertained.
Leach & Logan, supra note 1, at § 24.18. Accord, J. GRAY, supra note 1, at §§ 99-118; L. SIMES &
A. SMITH, supra note I, at § 1232.
Scholars have often suggested that the rule require vesting in possession rather than vesting in
interest. See Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Pervetuities Discard Its Vest, 56 MICH. L. REv.
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the creation' of the interest.' 8 The common-law rule embodies a pos-
sibilities test requiring that an interest be certain to vest within the pe-
riod specified.9 Any possibility, however unlikely, that an interest will
vest beyond the time permitted constitutes a violation of the rule.10
887 (1958); Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 737-38 (1955); Water-
bury, Some Further Thoughts on Perpetuities Reform, 42 MINN. L. REV. 41, 103 (1957).
5. The evolution of the permissible period under the Rule occurred during a time seg-
ment of about a century and a half, beginning late in the 17th century. The announced
criteria was "convenience," that is, the courts would sustain a limitation ... if the resul-
tant tie-up of the subject matter of the limitation was not "inconveniently long." A series
of important decisions followed this announcement, each holding the period involved in
the instrument was not too long. The period was held to be permissible when measured
by one life; ... by two lives plus one year, by one life plus an actual minority; by one
life plus a preceding and a following period of gestation; by nine lives plus any period of
gestation involved in the situation to which the limitation applied; by twenty-eight lives
plus a period in gross of twenty years. By this process of deciding each controversy as it
arose, the line between limitations causing a tie-up for a period "not inconveniently
long" and those causing a tie-up for an "inconveniently long" period were established.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, at § 1.11, Explanatory Note 2 (citations omitted). The
outer limit of the permissible period was finally set at "a life or lives in being, and twenty-one
years afterwards, without reference to the infancy of any person whatever." Cadell v. Palmer, 26
Eng. Rep. 956 (H.L. 1833).
For a discussion of whether to reduce the perpetuity period to correspond to the 18 year old age
of majority now existing in many states, see Soled, Effect of the Reduction of the Age of MaJority on
the Permissie Period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 34 MD. L. REv. 255 (1974). For an argu-
ment in favor of increasing this period to thirty years, see Waterbury, supra note 4, at 91.
6. See generally W. BuRBY, supra note 2, at 414; J. GRAY, supra note I, at §§ 216-19; 5 R.
POWELL, supra note 1, at 1 766[21-[5]; RESTATEMENT, supra note I, at § 374, Explanatory Notes h-
1; L. SIMES, supra note 1, at 265-67; L. SimEs & A. SMITH, supra note 1, at § 1223; Kiralfy, A "Lfe
in Being"for the Purpose of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 6 CONVEY. (n.s.) 191 (1942); Note, Un-
derstanding the Measuring Life in the Rule Against Perpetuities, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 265.
7. For almost all future interests, the period of the rule begins to run at the time the interest
is created. See W. BunnY, supra note 1, at 415; J. GRAY, supra note 1, at § 231; 5 R. POWELL,
supra note I, at 1 764[2]; RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 374, Comment a; L. SIMEs, supra note
1, at 267-68; L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note I, at § 1226; Leach & Logan, supra note 1, at
§ 24.12. When applied to a general power of appointment exercisable by deed or will, however,
the period begins to run from the exercise, not the creation, of the interest. L. SiMEs & A. SMITH,
supra note 1, at § 1271.
8. J. GRAY, supra note 1, at § 201 (footnotes added).
9. See J. GRAY, supra note 1, at § 2.14; R. MAUDSLEY, supra note 1, at 35-36; 5 R. POWELL,
supra note 1, at 9 76511]; RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 370, Comment k; L. SiMS, supra note
I, at 264-65; L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 1, at § 1228; Leach & Logan, supra note 1, at
§ 24.21; Tudor, Absolute Certainty of Vesting Under the uleAgainst Ferpetuites-A Self-Discred-
ited Relic, 34 B.U.L. REv. 129 (1954).
10. [T~he existence of the rule [against perpetuities] in these days is usually made mani-
fest only in cases where nothing of the kind having been desired or suspected, and where
by nothing short of a miracle could a perpetuity at any time have supervened, even that
possibility has, by the time of the contest, ceased to be existent. All the same in these
cases the rule is fatal even to gifts so innocuous, and I cannot doubt that such a result is
both mischievous and unfortunate ....
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/11
Number 2] WAIT-AND-SEE MEASURING LIVES
The requirement of initial"' certainty of vesting operates to invali-
date interests because of absurdly improbable contingencies, including
the now-familiar cases of unborn widows,' 2 fertile octagenarians,13 pre-
cocious toddlers,' 4 and magic gravel pits.' The performance of the
Ward v. Van der Loeff, [1924] A.C. 653, 679 (Blanesburgh, L.J.). See also R. MEGARRY & H.
WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 215 (1957).
11. See notes 30-33 infra and accompanying text.
12. Consider a devise to the children of A who survive A and his widow. At the testator's
death, .4 is 50 years old, married, and has grandchildren. A's marriage could possibly end at
anytime. He might marry a woman unborn at the testator's death. .4 might also have children
after the testator's death. Thus, the interest might vest in a child not born at the testator's death
upon the death of the widow more than 21 years after the death of everyone else alive at the
testator's death. This possibility offends the common-law rule, and the children's interests are
invalid. See Dickerson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 268 Ark. 292, 595 S.W.2d 677 (1980); Greenwich
Trust Co. v. Shively, 110 Conn. 117, 197 A. 367 (1929); Shewmake v. Robinson, 148 Ga. 287, 96
SE. 564 (1918); Momas v. Pullman Trust & Say. Bank, 371 IML 577, 21 N.E.2d 89 (1939); Keefer v.
McCloy, 344 IML 454, 176 N.E. 743 (1931); Easton v. Hall, 323 IlM. 397, 154 N.E. 216 (1926); Che-
noweth v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 698, 6 S.W.2d 1061 (1928); Perkins v. Iglehart, 183 Md. 520, 39 A.2d 672
(1944); Stryker v. Kennard, 339 Mass. 373, 159 N.E.2d 71 (1959); Gray v. Whittemore, 192 Mass.
367, 78 N.E. 422 (1906); Stones Ex'r v. Nicholson, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 1 (1876); Brookover v.
Grimm, 118 W. Va. 227, 190 S.E. 697 (1937). See generally W. BunnY, supra note 2, at 416; J.
GRAy, supra note 1, at § 214; 5 R. POWELL, supra note 1, at 76414]; L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra
note 1, at § 1230; Leach, Perpetulies in a Nutshell, 51 HRv. L. R~v. 638, 644 (1938); Leach &
Logan, supra note 1, at § 24.21.
13. Consider an inter vivos gift by B, a woman aged 60, to the first of her grandchildren to
attain the age of 21. At common law, this gift violated the rule because B was irrebutably pre-
sumed capable of having children. Therefore a child born after the gift might bear a grandchild
who would attain 21 beyond the period of the rule. See Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249
Mich. 238,228 N.W. 703 (1930); Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922); Loud v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 298 Mo. 148, 249 S.W. 629 (1923); Schumacher v. Howard Says. Inst., 126
N.J. Eq. 325, 8 A.2d 908 (1939); McPherson v. First Citizen's Nat'l Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 81 S.E.2d
386 (1954); Turner v. Turner, 260 S.C. 439, 196 S.E.2d 498 (1973); Ward v. Van der Loeff, [1924]
A.C. 653; Johnston v. Hill, 39 Ch. D. 155 (1888); lee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787).
14. The precocious toddler problem, the converse of the fertile octogenarian situation, in-
volves a gift that is invalid because of the common-law presumption that even infants can bear
children. Cf. Re Gaites Will Trusts, [1949] 1 All E.R. 459 (Ch.) (issue raised but avoided).
15. Assume .4 owns gravel pits which, given ordinary production, will be exhausted within
four years. .4 devises the property to B in trust, for operation until the pits are exhausted. A
directs the trustee to divide the pits among A's living heirs once they are exhausted. The pits
actually exhaust themselves in six years. However, the possibility that they might not be ex-
hausted for 50 or 100 years is enough to invalidate the gift under the common-law rule. In re
Wood, [1894] 3 Ch. 381. See generally J. GRAY, supra note 1, at § 509.8; L. SimEs & A. SMITH,
supra note 1, at § 1228; Leach, supra note 11, at 648.
No list of problems arising under the common-law rule is complete, however, without this
concern:
Consider the bride of some future astronaut. He is a junior officer, and prudently he and
his bride feel they should not have children until he gets a few promotions so that he can
finance their future education. He makes his deposit in the sperm bank. Then he is
Washington University Open Scholarship
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rule in these cases has produced severe criticism.' 6 In spite of such
criticism, the common-law rule still prevails in the majority of jurisdic-
tions in the United States. 1
7
A growing minority of jurisdictions, however, have enacted major
reforms in perpetuities law. The most popular reform is adoption of a
wait-and-see approach to the rule.'8 Wait-and-see replaces the corn-
incinerated in orbital flight. She is devastated. Devoted to him as she is, she wants a
child by him.
Leach, Perpetuitie in theAtomicAge The Sperm Bank and the Fertile Decedent, 48 A.B.A.J. 942,
943 (1962). If the astronaut's will provided a future interest for his grandchildren, the possibility
of a child born after his death would cause the interest to violate the common-law rule. Leach
describes this as the child en ventre safrigidaire problem. Leach, supra, at 943 n.3.
16. See, e.g., Leach, Perpetuties in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARV.
L. Rayv. 721 (1952); Leach, Perpetuities, Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents, 68 L.Q. REv. 35
(1952); Tudor, supra note 9; Waterbury, supra note 4.
17. See 5 R. POWELL, supra note 1, at 808-827 (surveying current perpetuities law in the
United States).
18. A simple form of wat and see is in substance a variation of Gray's statement of the
rule: "No interest in real or personal property is valid unless it vests, if at all, not later
than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest."
R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETuITEs 203 (1966) (emphasis added). See notes 1-
8 supra and accompanying text. See generally W. BuRBY, supra note 2, at 417; R. MAUDSLEY,
supra note 1, at 4-7; 5 R. POWELL, supra note 1, at 827B; L. SiMFS, supra note I, at 270-75; L.
SiMEs & A. SMrm, supra note 1, at § 1230; Maudsley, Perpetuities: Reforming the Common Law
Rule-How to Wait and See, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 355 (1975).
In the United States eight jurisdictions have adopted wait-and-see. Six have done so by statute.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22 (West Cum. Supp. 1982); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2131.08 (Page
1946); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6107 (Purdon 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1975); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 11.98.010 (1967).
The Kentucky statute is discussed in Dukeminier, Kentucky Perpetuities Law Restated and Re.
formed, 49 Ky. LJ. 3 (1960). On the Ohio statute see Lynn, Ohio PerpetuitiesReorm Statute, 34
OHIO ST. LJ. 1 (1968); Note, The Rule Against Perpetuities-Statutory Re/orm, 20 CASE W. RES.
L. R v. 295 (1969); 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 433 (1973). Scholarly review of the Pennsylvania provision
includes Bregy, A Defense of Pennsylvanias Statute on Ferpetuities, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 313 (1950);
Cohan, The Pennsylvania Wat-and-See Doctrine-New Kernelsfrom Old Nutshells, 28 TEMP. L.Q.
321 (1955); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail Pennsylvanial, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124 (1960);
Mechem, Further Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 965
(1959); Phipps, The Pennsylvania Experiment in Perpetuities, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 20 (1949).
Two more states have adopted walt-and-see by judicial construction without the aid of statute.
See Grynberg v. Amerada Hess Corp., 342 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Colo. 1972) (applying Mississippi
law); Phelps v. Shropshire, 254 Miss. 777, 183 So.2d 158 (1966); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis,
98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953).
Four more states have adopted limited walt-and-see schemes. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-95
(West 1960); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 101 (1978); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-103
(1969); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A § 1 (West 1977). See generaly Jones, Reforming The
Law-The Rule Against Pervetuties, 22 MD. L. REv. 269 (1962); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation,
Massachusetts Style, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1349 (1954); Note, RuleAgainst Perpetuitles-Recent Legis-
lation in Massachusetts, Maine and Connecticut, 54 MICH. L. Rav. 723 (1956). In these jurisdic-
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tions, an interest that violates the common-law rule is saved if it vests during life estates in the
same property given to persons alive at the creation of the interest. The Massachusetts provision
is typical:
In applying the rule against perpetuities to an interest in real or personal property lim-
ited to take effect at or after the termination of one or more life estates in, or lives of,
persons in being when the period of said rule commences to run, the validity of the
interest shall be determined on the basis of facts existing at the termination of such one
or more life estates or lives. In this section an interest which must terminate not later
than the death of one or more persons is a "life estate" even though it may terminate at
an earlier time.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, § I (West 1977).
Abroad, legislatures have adopted wat-and-see in: England, Perpetuities and Accumulations
Act 1964, ch. 55; New Zealand, Perpetuities Act 1964 [1964] N.Z. STAT. chs. 205-21; Northern
Ireland, Perpetuities Act (N.I.) 1966; the Australian States of Queensland, Property Law Act 1974;
Victoria, Perpetuities and Accumulations Act of 1968; and Western Australia, Law Reform Act
(Property, Perpetuities & Succession), 1962, ch. 83; and the Canadian provinces of Alberta, [1972]
ALTA. STAT. ch. 101; British Columbia, Perpetuities Act, [1975] B.C. STAT. ch. 53; and Ontario,
Perpetuities Act, 1966 [1970] REv. STAT. ONT. ch. 343.
For commentary on the English Act, see generally Morris & Wade, Perpetuities Reform at Last,
80 L.Q. REv. 486 (1964). On the Queensland provision, see Tarlo, Property Law Reform in
Queensland, 8 U. QUEENs L.J. 205, 233-35 (1974). The Victoria Act is discussed in Adam, Perpe-
tuidies andAccumulations Act 1968, 43 LAW INST. J. 445 (1969); Hogg & Ford, Yictorian Perpetu-
ties Law in a Nutshell, 7 MELB. U.L. REV. 155 (1969). For a discussion of the Western Australia
statute, see Allen, The Rule Against Perpetuities Restated, 6 U.W. AUSTL. L. REv. 27 (1963); Leach,
Perpetuities Reform. London Proposes, Perth Disposes, 6 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 11 (1963); Simes,
Reform of the Rule Against Perpetuities in Western Australia, 6 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 21 (1963).
The Ontario Act is discussed in Hogg, Ontario's Perpetuities Law, 2 EsT. & TRUSTS Q. 19 (1975).
Reform jurisdictions have also enacted statutes mandating the use of cypres to reform instru-
ments invalidated under the rule. Cypres allows reformation to produce a valid disposition that
approximates the donor's intention as closely as possible. As the Court explained in Edgerly v.
Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 448, 31 A. 900, 902 (1891):
If a will cannot be conformed to law unless devised property vests sooner than the
testator intended, the inquiry may be whether his intent as to the time of vesting is quali-
fied by his intent that the devisees shall have the property and that the devise shall be
carried into effect cypres. The construction which gives to an estate which the testator
gives to A's children is far from the intent on that subject; but if it is as near as possible, it
may accord with the intent on the subject of approximation.
Id. See generally Browder, Construction, Reformation and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 62 MICH.
L. REv. 1 (1963); Quarles, The Cy Pres Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule
Against Perpetuities and TrustsforAccumulation, 21 N.Y.U. L. REv. 384 (1946); 84 HARV. L. REv.
738 (1971); 46 WASH. L. Rav. 785 (1971).
In five states, two Canadian provinces, and New Zealand the judiciary uses the cypres doctrine
in connection with the wait-and-see doctrine. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Baldwin 1979);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2131.68(c) (Page 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6105 (Purdon 1975);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1975); WASH. REv. CODE § 11.98.630 (1967); [1972] ATLA. STAT. ch.
101; [1975] B.C. STAT. ch. 53; [1964] N.Z. STAT. chs. 205-21. Five other states use cypres in
connection with the common-law rule. CAL. CIV. CODE § 714.4 (Deering 1971); IDAHO CODE
§ 55-111 (1979); Mo. REV. STAT. § 442.555 (Vernon Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 60, § 74
(West Supp. 1980); TEx. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1291(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
The California statute is discussed in Simes, Perpetuities in California Since 1951, 18 HAsTINGS
LJ. 247 (1967); Comment, California Revises the Rule Against Perpetuities-4Again, 16 STAN. L.
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mon-law possibilities approach with an actualities test.19 The require-
REv. 177 (1963). For discussion of the Missouri statute, see Fratcher, The Missouri Perpetuitles
Act, 45 Mo. L. REv. 240 (1980). On the Oklahoma provision, see Comment, Pereuitie, Cy Prs
Invades Oklahoma, 25 OKLA. L. REv. 139 (1972). The Texas provision is discussed in Note,
Propery-Perpetuties-Txas Enacts Cy Pres Statute, 49 TEx. L. REv. 181 (1970). See also Leach,
CyPreson the March, 17 VAND. L. RE. 1381 (1964).
Other reform statutes attempt to "patch-up" particular problem areas in perpetuities law. Eight
states have statutes saving gifts that are invalid because they require beneficiaries in the third
generation to attain an age of more than 21 years before their interest will vest. The statutes
reduce the age requirement to 21 years. CONN. REV. STAT. § 45-97 (West 1960); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 689.22(4) (West Supp. 1980); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 30, § 194(a) (Smith-Hurd 1967); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 102 (1978); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-105 (1969); MASS GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, § 2 (West 1977); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney
1967). The Illinois statute is discussed in Note, Illinois v. The Rule Against Perpetuities, 3 J. MAR.
J. PRAc. & PRoc. 386 (1970).
Some states have enacted statutes addressed to the unborn widow problem. See note 12 supra
and accompanying text. The reform statutes create an irrebuttable presumption that the "widow"
referred to was in being at the creation of the interest. CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.7 (Deering 1971);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22(5)(b) (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(c)(3) (Smith-
Hurd 1978); N.Y. EsT., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(A) (McKinney 1967).
The fertile octagenarian problem, see note 13 supra and accompanying text, is solved by statutes
that presume infertility after a certain age. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22(5)(d) (West Supp. 1980)
(females over 55); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(c)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1978) (females over 65); N.Y.
EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 1967) (females over 55). Other statutes allow
the introduction of evidence rebutting the presumption of fertility. IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1957);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 24.5-112 (1979).
Other statutes prevent the precocious toddler, see note 14 supra and accompanying text, from
causing perpetuities problems by assuming that he or she is infertile until a certain age. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 30, § 194(c)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1978) (infertile until age 13); N.Y. EsT., POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 1967) (infertile until age 14).
19. The possibility that an interest might vest too remotely is irrelevant under wait-and-see.
If the interest actually vests too remotely, however, the rule will invalidate the interest. Consider
the unborn widow problem, supra note 12, under a wait-and-see analysis.
.4 devises to B for life, then to B's widow for life, remainder to their surviving children. B dies,
survived by B's widow who was not alive at A's death and children, one or more of whom were
born after the death of,,. The validity of the interest is determined by waiting and seeing:
(1) If B's widow dies survived by children of B of whom at least one is alive at A's
death, the contingent remainder to the children of B is good under "wait and see" and
vests at the death of the unborn widow.
(2) If B's widow dies within twenty-one years after the death of B and all of B's
children alive at A's death, survived by a child or children of B, the contingent remain-
der to the children of B is good under "wait and see" and vests at the death of the unborn
widow.
(3) If B's widow dies beyond twenty-one years after the death of B and all of B's
children alive at A's death, the contingent remainder to the children of B cannot vest
within the perpetuities period and is bad under "wait and see."
(4) If B's widow dies beyond twenty-one years after the death of B and all of B's
children alive at A's death, and all of B's children are dead twenty-one years after the
death of B and all of B's children alive at A's death, the contingent remainder to the
children of B fails by its own terms.
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ment that an interest be certain to vest within the time permitted is
replaced by a requirement that the interest actually vest within that
period. Because highly unlikely possibilities of remote vesting are sig-
nificant only if they materialize, wait-and-see would uphold otherwise
void limitations that vest in fact within the permissible period.20
The American Law Institute is the most recent addition to those
favoring reform. Over vigorous and distinguished dissent,2 the Insti-
tute has approved a wait-and-see version of the rule as applied to do-
native transfers for inclusion in the Restatement (Second) of Property.22
The approved draft provides for full wait-and-see,23 using specified
measuring lives24 and cypres reformation of interests that violate the
R. LYNN, supra note 18, at 74-75.
20. R. MAUDSLEY, supra note 1, at 80-81.
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, DONATIVE TRANSFERS, App. 127 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1978) (commentary by ex-reporter Richard R. Powell on proposed draft); ALI, THE
RULE AGAINST PERPETUrriEs (1978) (transcript of discussion of Tentative Draft No. I at the 55th
Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute).
22. On May 18, 1979, the American Law Institute approved The Restatement (Second) of
Propero Donati'e Transfers. See Comment, Rule Against Perpetuitles: The Second Restatement
Adopts Wait and See, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1063, 1063 n.1 (1979).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, at § 1.4 provides: "[A] donative transfer of an
interest in property fails if the interest does not vest, if it ever vests, within the period of the rule
against perpetuities."
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, at § 1.3 provides:
(1) If an examination of the situation with respect to a donative transfer as of the
time the period of the rule against perpetuities begins to run reveals a life or lives in
being within 21 years after whose deaths the non-vested interest in question will neces-
sarily vest, if it ever vests, such life or lives are the measuring lives for purposes of the
rule against perpetuities so far as such non-vested interest is concerned and such non-
vested interest cannot fail under the rule. A provision that terminates a non-vested inter-
est if it has not vested within 21 years after the death of the survivor of a reasonable
number of persons named in the instrument of transfer and in being when the period of
the rule begins to run is within this subsection.
(2) If no measuring life with respect to a donative transfer is produced under subsec-
tion 1, the measuring lives for purposes of the rule against perpetuities as applied to the
non-vested interest in question are:
a. The transferor if the period of the rule begins to run in the transferor's life-
time; and
b. Those individuals alive when the period of the rule begins to run, if reason-
able in number, who have beneficial interests vested or contingent in the property in
which the non-vested interest in question exists and the parents and grandparents
alive when the period of the rule begins to run of all beneficiaries of the property in
which the non-vested interest exists, and
c. The donee of a nonfiduciary power of appointment alive when the period of
the rule begins to run if the exercise of such power could affect the non-vested inter-
est in question.
A child in gestation when the period of the rule begins to run who is later born alive is
treated as a life in being at the time the period of the rule begins and, hence, may be a
measuring life.
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rule.25
The American Law Institute's endorsement of wait-and-see may spur
interest in perpetuities reform in this country, and warrants a new con-
sideration of the wait-and-see doctrine.26 The draft's use of specified
measuring lives is important in the development of the wait-and-see
doctrine. Identification of appropriate measuring lives is one of the
most difficult and often criticized aspects of the wait-and-see doctrine.
27
This Note addresses the problem of defining appropriate measuring
lives for the wait-and-see rule. Part II of this Note explains why the
adoption of wait-and-see raises a measuring life problem not encoun-
tered under the common law. Part III addresses the policies underlying
the rule against perpetuities which reformers should consider in formu-
lating a wait-and-see measuring life concept. Finally, Part IV of this
At its May 18, 1979 meeting, the American Law Institute deleted subsection (2)(c), which pro-
vided: "(c) Those other individuals alive when the period of the rule begins to run, if reasonable
in number, who are specifically mentioned in describing the beneficiaries of the property in which
the non-vested interest in question exists. . . ." See Comment, supra note 22, at 1066 n.10.
25. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, at § 1.5 provides:
If under a donative transfer an interest in property fails because it does not vest or
cannot vest within the period of the rule against perpetuities, the transferred property
shall be disposed of in the manner which most closely effectuates the transferor's mani-
fested plan of distribution, which is within the limits of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
26. An examination of the overall merits of wait-and-see is beyond the scope of this Note,
but scholars have covered that ground well. See Bregy, supra note 18; Browder, supra note 18;
Cohan, supra note 18; Dukeminier, supra note 18; Eckhardt, Perpetuities Reform by Legslaion, 31
Mo. L. REv. 56 (1966); Fetters, Perpetuities.: The Wait andSee Disaster, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 380
(1975); Jones, supra note 18; Leach, supra note 15; Leach, Perpetuities: NewAbsurdity, Judicial and
Statutory Correctives, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1518 (1960); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachu-
setts Style, supra note 18; Leach, Prp~.tuiiles in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror,
supra note 16; Leach, supra note 3; Leach, Perpetuities Reform by Legislation, 70 L.Q. REV. 478
(1954); Leach, Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents, supra note 16; Leach, Perpetuti-
ties LegislationL" Hail Pennsylvanial, supra note 18; Lynn, Reforming the Common Law Rule
Against Perpetuities, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 488 (1961); Lynn, Perpetuities Reform: An Analysis of
Developments in England and the United States, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 508 (1965); Lynn, Raising theP'erpetuities Questiot Conception, Adoption, "Wait and See" and C Pres, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1391
(1964); Maudsley, supra note 18; Mechem, A BriefReply to Professor Leach, 108 U. PA. L. REV.
1155 (1960); Mechem, supra note 18; Morris & Wade, Perpetuities Reform at Last, 80 L.Q. REV.
486 (1964); Schuyler, Should We Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities?, 41 CHI. B. REc. 139
(1959); Schuyler, supra note 4; Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wail and
See"Doctrine, 51 MICH. L. REv. 179 (1953); Simes, supra note 4; Tudor, supra note 9; Waterbury,
supra note 4.
27. See Allen, Perpetuities, Who are the Lives in Being?, 81 L.Q. REv. 106 (1965); Jones,
Measuring Lives Under the Pennsylvania Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
54, 54-55 (1960); Simes, supra note 26, at 184.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/11
WAIT-AND-SEE MEASURING LIVES
Note reviews the various methods now used to resolve the measuring
life problem.
II. THE PROBLEM
The rule against perpetuities allows a future interest to remain con-
tingent for a life in being plus twenty-one years after its creation.28
Wait-and-see retains this general statement of the rule, but substan-
tially alters the practical meaning of "life in being." This alteration
creates the measuring life problem.
A. The Common-Law Lives
At common law, any person alive at the creation of a future interest
is a life in being for that interest.29 Most of these lives, however, are
irrelevant to perpetuities analysis. The common-law rule is concerned
with possibilities.3" A life might end at any moment. Most lives in
being, then, can end the day after an interest is created without bring-
ing the interest any closer to vesting.3' Because an interest will not
necessarily vest within twenty-one years of these lives in being, the lives
do not validate the interest.32
The critical lives in determining an interest's validity at common law
are the causal lives; those lives that play a part in the grantor's scheme
of distribution.33 Causal lives extend or shorten the time in which a
future interest can possibly vest.34 The end of each causal life brings a
future interest one step closer to vesting.35 Because causal lives define
the period in which an interest can vest, identification of a causal life
28. See notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text.
29. Jones, supra note 27, at 59-60; Simes, supra note 26, at 187; Note, supra note 6, at 273.
30. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
31. Simes, supra note 26, at 187.
32. Id.
33. Morris & Wade, supra note 26, at 496-501; Note, supra note 6, at 281.
34. [l]t is obvious that the [common-law] lives in being select themselves without diffi-
culty; the law allows any lives to be used, but no lives can be of the slightest use unless
they somehow restrict the period of time within which the gift is to be capable of vesting
according to the conditions laid down by the donor. No other lives can possibly help,
since they have nothing to do with the conditions appointed by the donor for the vesting
of the gift.
Morris & Wade, supra note 26, at 496.
35. Consider a gift to the grandchildren of-A who attain the age of2l. The causal lives areA,
A's spouse, if any, A's children and their spouses, if any, and the grandchildren. As each of these
individuals dies, his or her death accelerates the time at which the full and final membership of
the class of grandchildren is determined.
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whose end will necessarily cause the interest to vest within twenty-one
years is possible in most cases.36  That life is the interest's validating
life. The transaction does not violate the rule if a validating life is
found. If no such causal life exists, the rule invalidates the interest.
37
The common-law requirement that an interest necessarily vest in time
thus confines the lives that might validate an interest to the causal lives
in being at the interest's creation.
B. The Wait-And-See Lives
Wait-and-see does not require that an interest be certain to vest
within the perpetuities period.38 The requirement of initial certainty of
vesting, therefore, no longer operates to restrict the relevant lives in
being to the causal lives.39 Wait-and-see requires definition of a new
class of lives, the measuring lives.4 Wait-and-see will wait during the
36. Consider a devise to the first grandchild of the testator to attain age 21. The children of
the testator are the causal lives in being. The grandchildren will attain age 21, if at all, within 21
years of the death of the last oftestator's children. Therefore, the children are validating lives and
the gift is valid. See McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340, 383-84 (1885); Tuttle v. Sisele, 281 Ky. 218,
224-25, 135 S.W.2d 436, 439-40 (1959); Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321, 361-62, 140 So.2d 843, 848
(1962); Lux v. Lux. 109 R.I. 592, 598-99, 288 A.2d 701, 705 (1972); Otterback v. Bohrer, 87 Va.
548, 552, 12 S.E. 1013, 1014 (1891). See generally Note, su ra note 6, at 289.
37. If no validating life exists, the interest is not certain to vest within 21 years of a life in
being at the time the interest was created. See notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text.
38. Wait-and-see requires only that an interest actually vest within the perpetuities period.
Initial certainty of vesting is, therefore, irrelevant. See W. BuRBY, spra note 2, at 417; R. LYNN,
supra note 17, at 34; 5 R. PowELI., supra note 1, at I 827-B; L. SiMES, supra note 1, at 270-7 1; L.
SIMEs & A. SMrTH, supra note 1, at § 1230; Maudsley, supra note 18, at 363.
39. No further formulation [of common-law lives] was required .... The reason for
this, it is suggested, is "the initial certainty rule"-the requirement. . . that an interest is
valid only if it is possible to say at the date of the creation of an interest that it must
necessarily vest in time, if it vests at all. This requirement immediately restricts the
range of lives that one need consider for the purposes of the [common-law] rule.
." O'3ne the requirement of initial certainty is removed and a "wait-and-see" rule in-
troduced, the problem of lives in being becomes acute.
Allen, supra note 27, at 107-08.
40. This is a policy decision. The introduction of the principle of wait-and-see is an
attempt to avoid the invalidation of a disposition which does in fact vest within 21 years
of the death of a person in being at the date of the gift. Anyone can be chosen to serve as
a measuring or validating life.
. The question to ask, when considering a candidate for inclusion is: if the interest
vests within 21 years of that person's death, would I wish to uphold the gift? It is impor-
tant to get this question right, and to get away from outdated concepts of including only
lives who were "relevant" in the context of the common law Rule.
Maudsley, supra note 18, at 375, 377.
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measuring lives, plus twenty-one years, for an interest to vest.
The common law provides little guidance in ascertaining the appro-
priate measuring lives. At common law, no waiting was allowed. The
validity of an interest was determined with reference to facts as they
stood when the interest was created.4 Although commentators have
vigorously debated the issue,42 the common law had no reason to de-
fine an appropriate class of measuring lives.4 3
The 1962 Western Australia Perpetuities Act" illustrates the impos-
sibility of ascertaining wait-and-see measuring lives from the common
law. This statute provided that it did not incorporate any lives other
than the common-law lives in being.4" Although Australian courts
have not yet had the opportunity to construe the measuring life provi-
sion, scholars have argued for three different constructions. Because
the statute speaks of "lives in being," some scholars have argued that
any common-law life in being can serve as a measuring life under the
Australian statute.46 Under this analysis, an interest is valid if it vests
within twenty-one years of the death of the survivor of all persons alive
at the interest's creation. A remotely vesting future interest would
withstand perpetuities attack if the beneficiaries could produce a cente-
narian who was alive at the time the interest was created.47
41. See W. BuRy, supra note 2, at 415; R. LYNN, supra note 17, at 33-34; 5 R. POWELL,
supra note 1, at 7-65 [1]; RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 370, Comment m; L. SIMEs, supra
note 1, at 267-68; L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 1, at § 1228; Leach & Logan, supra note 1, at
§ 24.24.
42. Compare R. MAUDSLEY, supra note 1, at 106; Allen, supra note 27, at 108-09; Jones, supra
note 27, at 59-60; Mechem, supra note 18, at 981-82and Simes, A QualfedEndorsement, 92 TR. &
EST. 770, 771-72 (1953) with Leach, supra note 18, at 1145; Cohan, supra note 18, at 332-36 and
Morris & Wade, supra note 26, at 487-88.
43. "[A]t common law.., the problem [of measuring lives] has no practical significance and
never had to be answered directly." Allen, supra note 18, at 45.
44. Western Australia Law Reform Act of 1962, ch. 83 (W. AustI.).
45. The statute provided that it did not "make any person a life in being for the purpose of
ascertaining the perpetuity period unless that person would have been considered a life in being if
[the statute] had not been adopted." Id. § 7(c).
46. See Jones, supra note 27, at 60; Simes, supra note 26, at 187.
47. [T]here is a devise to such of testator's lineal descendants as are alive 120 years after
the testator's death.... One can imagine, in such a case, remote lineal descendants
patiently awaiting the termination of the 120 year period, not knowing after all this time
whether the limitation is good or bad. And finally, at the end of the 120th year, the
attorney for the descendants advertises for evidence concerning any person who died
twenty years ago and who was at least one hundred years old at the time of his death.
Doubtless the attorney will eventually find such a person. For in every year there must
be at least a few persons who die at the age of one hundred. But what a fantastic way to
determine the validity of a future interest.
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Other scholars have argued that the common law implicitly adopted
causal lives as the measuring lives.4" Under this interpretation, an in-
terest is valid only if it vests within twenty-one years of the last remain-
ing causal life.49 Little support exists, however, for the proposition that
the common law equated causal and measuring lives.5 0
The final scholarly view is the most restrictive. Under this view, the
only lives recognized by the common-law rule were those that vali-
dated an interest. The Australian statute would therefore permit only
common-law validating lives51 as measuring lives. This view has the
support of the statute's author.52 If his interpretation is ultimately
adopted, Western Australia's wait-and-see provision does nothing more
than reenact the common law.5
3
The Western Australia statute exemplifies the difficulty of defining
wait-and-see measuring lives in terms of common-law concepts.5 4
Moreover, even if such a definition were possible, it is not necessarily
Simes, supra note 26, at 187.
48. How then are these principles affected by the change-over to "wait and see"? The
first point to observe is that the object of the change is not to alter the length or nature of
the perpetuity period, but merely to discard the certainty doctrine in favor of the "wait
and see" doctrine.... There is nothing whatever in this change of policy to require
any change in the method used for ascertaining the perpetuity period, or for ascertaining
the relevant lives in being. As before, the relevant lives in being should be those which
restrict the period of time within which the appointed conditions for vesting can be ful-
filled, and no others.
Morris & Wade, supra note 26, at 497-98. Accord, Cohan, supra note 16, at 332-36; Leach, supra
note 16.
49. See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text.
50. See Allen, supra note 18, at 45; Fetters, supra note 26, at 405-06; Maudsley, supra note 18,
at 375.
51. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
52. Allen, supra note 27, at 111-12.
53. "[I]f the only lives who may be used for wait-and-see are those who have already vali-
dated the gift, [under a common-law analysis] we would never wait and see at all." Maudsley,
supra note 18, at 374 (citation omitted).
54. Unfortunately, both Queensland and Victoria have adopted very similar provisions. The
Victoria Perpetuities and Accumulations Act of 1968, § 6(4) provides:
Nothing in this sedtion makes any person a life in being for the purposes of ascertaining
the perpetuity period unless the life of that person is one expressed or implied as relevant
for this purpose by the terms of the disposition and would have been reckoned a life in
being for such purpose if this section had not been enacted:
Provided however that in the case of a disposition to a class of persons or to one or
more members of a class, any person living at the date of the disposition whose life is so
expressed or implied as relevant for any member of the class may be reckoned a life in
being in ascertaining the perpetuity period.
Id. See also Queensland Property Law Act of 1974.
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desirable.55 Wait-and-see statutes should look to the policies underly-
ing the rule to define appropriate measuring lives.
III. PERPETUITIES POLICY
The heart of the rule against perpetuities is the regulation of remote
vesting.56 The wait-and-see measuring lives define the time period in
which a future interest must vest. The rule invalidates only those inter-
ests that fail to vest during a time period defined by the measuring lives
plus twenty-one years.57 Because the definition of measuring lives thus
affects the basic operation of the rule, the criteria for selecting measur-
ing lives should rest on the policies that justify the rule's restriction of
remote vesting.
The rule against perpetuities serves both restrictive and permissive
social policies. The rule is recognized mainly as a restriction on the
ability of property owners to control the devolution of property for long
periods after they had passed on ownership of the property.58 Histori-
cally, jurists viewed such a restriction as necessary to preserve the alien-
ability of property.5 9 This rationale has little merit given the nature of
modem future interests. Currently almost all future interests consist of
securities held in trust.60 Trust instruments usually confer broad pow-
ers upon the trustees to sell or reinvest the trust corpus.6' Even real
property subject to contingent future interests is substantially more
alienable today than it was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries.6 2 Contingent future interests today are alienable regardless of the
55. [E]ven if it were possible to delineate a category of common law [measuring] lives
. .. [t]here is no assurance that they will be the right lives for wait-and-see. Wait-and-
see is a new concept in the law of perpetuities. There is no reason to suppose that com-
mon law lives would be appropriate in this new era. One needs to take a fresh look at
the situation and ask: who ought to be a measuring life under wait-and-see?
Maudsley, supra note 18, at 375.
56. R. LYNN, supra note 17, at 9; L. Sims, supra note 1, at 253; L. SiMm & A. SMrrH, supra
note I, at § 1222; Leach & Logan, supra note 1, at § 24.3. Cf. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 1, at T 7.62
(questioning remote vesting rationale).
57. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 59-65 infra and accompanying text.
59. J. GRAY, supra note 1, at § 2.1; R. LYNN, supra note 17, at 10; J. MoRms & W. LEACH,
THE RULE AGAiNST PERPETuTEs 13-15 (2d ed. 1962); 5 R. POWELL, supra note 1, at 762; L.
StMs, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 33-38 (1955); Simes, supra note 4, at 708-11; 84
HARv. L. REv. 738, 739-40 n.5 (1971).
60. Mechem, supra note 18, at 968-69; Simes, supra note 4, at 717-18.
61. Id.
62. L. SUAEs, supra note 59, at 43-46; L. SIMEs & A. SMrrH, supra note 1, at §§ 1941-43.
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time at which the future interests vest.63
The rule's restriction on remote vesting retains its viability today be-
cause modem justifications have replaced the concern for alienability.
The prevention of remotely vesting interests strikes a balance between
the desires of past and future generations to control the devolution of
their property.6' The restriction tends to prevent dynastic concentra-
tions of wealth.65 Some jurists believe that insulation from the need to
participate and prove one's self in economic affairs is inconsistent with
the prevailing capitalist economic viewpoint.66 Finally, the restriction
against remote vesting, by freeing assets from trust restrictions, ensures
a ready supply of capital for investment in risk ventures61 and tends to
divert available assets from capital to consumer investment.68  These
considerations justify the substantially unanimous view that the restric-
tion against remote vesting remains necessary.69
63. "I believe it is no exaggeration to say that, at the present time, due to changes both in the
nature of capital investments and in the law, the proposition that contingent future interests make
property unproductive is rarely true in the United States and almost never true in England."
Simes, supra note 4, at 712 (emphasis omitted).
64. J. MoRm & W. LEACH, supra note 59, at 17; L. SnviEs, supra note 59, at 59-60; Simes,
supra note 4, at 708-09.
65. L. SIMES, supra note 59, at 57-58; Fetters, supra note 26, at 408-09; Leach, Perpeluilies
Legislatior HailtPennsylvanial, supra note 18, at 1136; 84 HARV. L. REV. 738, 739-40 n.5 (1971).
The rule, however, may provide a less effective means of controlling concentration of wealth than
other methods available, such as taxes. See L. SIMEs, supra note 59, at 56-57; Leach, Perpetuftles
in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, supra note 16, at 727.
66. The keeping of property free to answer the exigencies of its possessor was a corollary
of the English stress on individualism and rested. . . upon a competitive theory. It is
obvious that limitations unalterably effective over a long period of time would hamper
the normal operation of the competitive struggle. Persons less fit, less keen in the social
struggle, might be thereby enabled to retain property disproportionate to their skills in
the competitive struggle. Hence the rule against perpetuities can be regarded as further-
ing the effective operation of the competitive system.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 2132. See Leach, Perpetulties Legislation: 1ail Pennsylvanlal,
upra note 18, at 1137; Simes, supra note 4, at 722-23.
67. L. SimEs, supra note 59, at 60, Simes, supra note 4, at 724; 84 HARV. L. REV. 738, 739.40
n.5 (1971).
68. L. Sums, supra note 59, at 61; Simes, supra note 4, at 724-25; 84 HARv. L. REv. 738, 739-
40 n.5 (1971).
69. Of course there are dissenters:
It is probably pointless for me to voice my belief that if there were no Rule against
Perpetuities today nobody would think of calling for one; the impact of the income tax
and death duties is such as to preclude the perpetuation of great landed estates or even
great personal fortunes, at which the Rule was aimed. I cite as evidence our state of
Wisconsin, which has its share of wealthy men but no Rule against Perpetuities applica-
ble to the usual testamentary or inter vivos trust. No inconvenience has appeared, for
property owners simply have no inclination to tie up property for long periods, the un-
certainties of life and taxes being what they are.
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The permissive character of the rule, however, is more important to
the wait-and-see concept. The rule allows a property owner to control
assets for a life in being plus twenty-one years after relinquishing own-
ership.70 The wait-and-see measuring lives, which define this period,
should reflect a sensitivity to the policies that underlie this limited def-
erence to the owner's wishes. Commentators most often explain the
perpetuities period7 of the rule as an historic anomoly, understandable
only in its case-by-case development at common law.72 Closer exami-
nation reveals that the perpetuities period is well suited for its function
in both length and means of measurement.
Estate planning concerns require measurement of the perpetuities
period in lives. A property owner planning his estate is understandably
concerned with legal restrictions on his ability to leave property to fu-
ture generations.73 By defining the perpetuities period in terms of lives,
the rule permits generational estate planning.74
The length of the perpetuities period allows the testator to control his
estate for only so far into the future as he has good reason. The perpe-
tuities period has its origin in the Duke of Norfolk's Case.75 That case
involved a testator's efforts to structure his estate around an insane
son.76 Against this background, the perpetuities period has a reason-
able length. The rule allows the donor to pass judgment on the ability
Leach, supra note 18, at 12.
70. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
71. This Note uses "perpetuities period" to refer to the time in which an interest is allowed to
remain contingent under the rule, that is, a life in being plus twenty-one years.
72. See J. GRAY, supra note 1, at §§ 216-29; RESTATEMENT, supra note I, at § 1.1, reporter's
note 2; L. SIMES, supra note 1, at 257-58; L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note I, at §§ 1214-15; Note,
supra note 6, at 272.
73. The point is that for a rule conceived prospectively... the period of the rule works
very well. What else could you do? What sense would a period in gross make? "Re-
mainders must be limited so as to surely vest in fifty years."
This, I submit, is possible but not sensible. It does not fit the thinking nor the needs of
a testator. What in the world, T will say to his attorney; how in the world can you
provide for things in terms of fifty years? Tell me: can I leave it to my children, my
grandchildren, my great grandchildren? Can I keep it from them until they are thirty?
And so on.
Mechem, supra note 18, at 972-73. Accord, Waterbury, supra note 4, at 90, 91.
74. This is the best reason for rejecting proposals to define the perpetuities period by a set
period in gross. See R. MAUDSLEY, supra note 1, at 223-24; Dick, Editor's Note, 4 EsT. & TR. Q.
133 (1977); Dick, Editor's Note, 2 EsT. & TR. Q. 44 (1975).
75. 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (ch. 1682), rev'd, 22 Eng. Rep. 963 (Ch. App. 1683), rev'd, 22 Eng. Rep.
963 (H.L. 1685).
76. See Barry, The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 23 VA. L. REv. 538 (1937); Haskins, supra note 1,
at 19-20.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
of the generation in being to manage his estate. The law defers to the
testator's judgment as to the limitations necessary to provide for ex-
isting generations while preserving the estate for the next generation.
In addition, the rule allows a donor to require the next, as yet unborn,
generation to attain their majority before permitting their interests to
vest.
77
The rule does not, however, allow the testator to impose restrictions
on his estate that extend beyond the minority of the first generation
unborn at the testator's death. Such restrictions would indicate that
the testator was attempting to pass judgment, even though unfamiliar
with that generation's ability to manage the estate. Therefore, the so-
cial interest in restricting remotely vesting future interests predomi-
nates over the testator's speculative efforts at control. 9
The policies underlying the rule should control the measuring life
definition. The measuring lives should define a period that allows the
donor to control his estate through the existing generation and the mi-
nority of the next generation. The rule should invalidate any restric-
tions that last longer.
IV. CURRENT APPROACHES
Existing wait-and-see statutes have adopted one of three distinct ap-
proaches to the measuring life problem.
A. The Pennsylvania Approach
When the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a wait-and-see rule in
1947,80 it failed completely to address the measuring life problem.8"
This failure ignited a scholarly debate similar to that which followed
passage of the Western Australia statute.82 Critics of the statute argued
that all common-law lives in being would qualify as measuring lives,
77. Waterbury, supra note 4, at 90-91; Leach & Logan, supra note 1, at § 24.16.
78. See notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text.
79. See notes 59-69 supra and accompanying text.
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6104 (Purdon 1975).
81. The statute provided only:
Upon the expiration of the period allowed by the common law rule against perpetu-
ities as measured by actual rather than possible events, any interest not then vested and
any interest in members of a class the membership of which is then subject to increase
shall be void.
Id.
82. See notes 44-55 supra and accompanying text.
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the "centenarian" approach. 3 Supporters expressed confidence that
the courts would allow the use of only common-law causal lives.84
The first decision construing the Pennsylvania statute, In re Pearson's
Estate,85 surprised both camps. In Pearson the testator established a
trust to pay income to his brothers and sisters during their lives.86
Upon the death of one of the testator's siblings, that share was to
descend per stirpes87 to the deceased sibling's children, and so on ad
infinitum, until the line of testator's collective heirs was extinguished.88
The Pearson court addressed the appropriate measuring lives problem
in terms of classes. The validity of the gift to the testator's nieces and
nephews thus depended on the validity of the class of brothers and sis-
ters as measuring lives. 89 The court concluded that a class was valid
and would contain measuring lives only if no members of the class
were born after the testator's death.9 Because the testator's parents
were deceased, the testator would not have more brothers and sisters.
The gift to the testator's nieces and nephews was therefore valid.91 The
class of nieces and nephews, however, would contain valid measuring
lives only if no more nieces and nephews were born, thus joining the
class after the testator's death. The validity of the gift to grandnieces
and grandnephews depend on this contingency.92
The result in Pearson is inconsistent with the policies underlying the
rule's perpetuity period.93 The testator chose not to entrust full posses-
sion of his estate to his existing siblings or his nephews and nieces.94
The court's holding frustrated the testator's decision and would arbi-
83. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 27, at 59-60; Mechem, supra note 18, at 981-82.
84. See, ag., Cohan, supra note 18, at 332-36.
85. 442 Pa. 172, 275 A.2d 336 (1971).
86. Id. at 177-78, 275 A.2d at 337-38.
87. This term, derived from the civil law.. . denotes that method of dividing an intes-
tate estate where a class or group of distributees take the share which their deceased
would have been entitled to, taking this by their right of representing such ancestor, and
not as so many individuals.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1030 (5th ed. 1979).
88. 442 Pa. at 177-78, 275 A.2d at 337-38.
89. Id. at 189-91, 275 A.2d at 344.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See notes 56-79 supra and accompanying text.
94. The testator intended to deny full possession to the entire line of his collateral heirs.
Although his intention is clearly an effort to exceed the limits of the rule, it is not a justification for
invalidating interests that vest within the permissible period.
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trarily vest an absolute interest in the existing nieces and nephews, if
another niece or nephew was born.95 The Pearson court confused wait-
ing as to the time of vesting with waiting as to measuring lives.96
If the result in Pearson is unacceptable, the responsibility rests with
the Pennsylvania legislature. A legislature attempting a wait-and-see
approach can not ignore the importance of the measuring life problem.
Unfortunately, the wait-and-see provisions of Ohio,9 7 Vermont98 and
Florida99 are also silent on the measuring life problem. The judicial
development of the measuring life concept in these jurisdictions may
conclusively demonstrate the need for a statutory definition of wait-
and-see measuring lives."°
B. Statutory Lists
The simplest method for defining the measuring lives permitted by a
wait-and-see rule is to enact a list of permissible lives. England 1' and
the commonwealth nations have taken this approach.102 The American
Law Institute's wait-and-see provision also incorporates the statutory
list scheme. 103
These statutes retain the common-law rule. Those instruments that
95. Thus if an additional niece or nephew was born after the testator's death, the nieces and
nephews, as a class, would not qualify as measuring lives. 442 Pa. at 191, 275 A.2d at 344. The
interest would vest, under Pennsylvania law, in the last valid income beneficiaries; in this case, the
siblings, nephews and nieces. Id. at 191-92, 275 A.2d at 344-45. The testator had judged these
very people undeserving of an unrestricted interest.
96. Maudsley, supra note 18, at 369.
97. OHIo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 213.03(c) (Page 1975) provides:
Any interest in real or personal property which would violate the rule against perpetu-
ities. . . shall be reformed, within the limits of the rule, to approximate most closely the
intention of the creator of the interest. In determining whether an interest would violate
the rule and in reforming an interest the period of perpetuities shall be measured by
actual rather than possible events.
98. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1975). The Vermont provision is virtually identical to the
Ohio statute. See note 97 supra.
99. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22(2)(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1982) provides: "[I]n determining
whether an interest violates the rule against perpetuities, the validity of the interest is determined
on the basis of facts existing at the end of the lives in being used to measure the permissible period
or, if no life in being is used, the facts existing at the end of the 21-year period.
100. Allen, supra note 18, at 110.
101. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c.55.
102. The measuring life provisions of the wait-and-see statutes of Northern Ireland, Alberta,
British Columbia and New Zealand are virtually identical to the measuring life provisions of the
English Act. See note 18 supra. Professor Maudsley has proposed a similar statutory list measur-
ing life approach. See R. MAUDSLEY, supra note 1, at 259-61.
103. See note 24 supra.
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the common-law rule would invalidate are subject to redemption under
the wait-and-see provisions. 1' The statutes allow only measuring lives
that are ascertainable at the creation of the interest. 10 5 The measuring
lives must not consist of individuals who are part of an unreasonably
large class. 106 Finally, the statutes limit the measuring lives to mem-
bers of defined groups, typically including: the donor; the beneficiaries;
persons receiving powers of appointment or options affecting the prop-
erty in question; and parents or grandparents of the beneficiaries. 10 7
The statutory list has the advantage of clarity and ease of administra-
tion. Because the statute specifies permissible classes of measuring
lives, the ones appropriate to a particular disposition can be easily
identified at the outset.' 08 To ascertain the perpetuities period, then,
the administrator need only add twenty-one years to the date of the last
surviving measuring life."°
The statutory list approach may, however, achieve administrative ef-
104. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act of 1964, ch. 55, § 3(l) provides:
Where. . . a disposition would be void on the ground that the interest disposed of
might not become vested until too remote a time the disposition shall be treated, until
such time (if any) as it becomes established that the vesting must occur, if at all, after the
end of the perpetuity period, as if the disposition were not subject to the rule ....
See also REsTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 21, at § 1.3(1).
105. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1965, ch. 55, § 3(4).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 3(5) provides:
The said persons are as follows:-
(a) the person by whom the disposition was made;
(b) a person to whom or in whose favour the disposition was made, that is to say-
(i) in the case of a disposition to a class of persons, any member or potential
member of the class;
(ii) in the case of an individual disposition to a person taking only on certain
conditions being satisfied, any person as to whom some of the conditions are
satisfied and the remainder may in time be satisfied;
(iii) in the case of a special power of appointment exercisable in favour of
members of a class, any member or potential member of the class;
(iv) in the case of a special power of appointment exercisable in favour of one
person only, that person or, where the object of the power is ascertainable only
on certain conditions being satisfied, any person as to whom some of the condi-
tions are satisfied and the remainder may in time be satisfied;
(v) in the case of any power, option or other right, the person on whom the
right is conferred,
(c) a person having a child or grandchild within sub-paragraphs (i) to (iv) of para-
graph (b) above, or any of whose children or grandchildren, if subsequently born,
would by virtue of his or her descent fall within those sub-paragraphs;
(d) any person on the failure or determination of whose prior interest the disposition
is limited to take effect.
108. Maudsley, supra note 18, at 377.
109. Id. at 379.
Washington University Open Scholarship
596 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
ficiency at the expense of the best choice of measuring lives. In some
cases, the statutory list may allow the use of inappropriate measuring
lives." 0 Under the English Act, for example, the "person by whom the
disposition is made" is always considered a measuring life.", Use of
the transferor as a measuring life is clearly appropriate if the transferor
retains some interest in the property or transfers the property to future
generations of his or her family." 2
In some situations, however, the grantor is an inappropriate measur-
ing life. Consider an inter vivos gift byA to B for life and then to the
children of B who attain age thirty. In terms of policy, the rule should
invalidate A's restrictions if they extend beyond the life of B and
twenty-one years thereafter."l3 This period allows A to restrict the con-
trol given the generation that he is familiar with and to ensure that the
next generation attains their majority before gaining control of the
property. In the hypothetical, by contrast, the interest might not vest
until thirty years after B's death. Under the English statutory list, ifA
outlives B by nine years, the interest is nevertheless valid. 14 The use of
the donor as a measuring life in this situation produces an arbitrary
result at odds with the policies underlying the rule. The practical effect
of the mandatory inclusion of extraneous measuring lives'1 s is an ex-
tension of the perpetuities period in a random group of cases.Y
6
In other cases statutory lists exclude appropriate measuring lives.
Consider a devise to the children of A alive at the death of A and any
woman whoA may marry." 7 IfA is unmarried at the time of the gift,
his eventual spouse is not "ascertainable at the commencement of the
perpetuities period.""' 8 Even if A's spouse is alive at the time of the
110. This Note will use the term "extraneous" measuring lives to refer to those lives that
should not qualify as measuring lives.
111. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, ch. 55, § 3(5)(a).
112. Morris & Wade, supra note 26, at 500-02.
113. See notes 56-79 supra and accompanying text.
114. If A outlives B by nine years, the children of B will attain the age of thirty exactly
twenty-one years afterA's death. BecauseA, as the donor, is a measuring life, the interest is valid.
115. See note I10 supra.
116. mhe statute casts its net so widely in order to cover every conceivable case that
many quite inappropriate lives are included whose continuance have no relevance to the
vesting whatsoever. The result is to extend the "wait-and-see" period beyond what any-
one contemplated and beyond what wise policy would seem to dictate.
Morris & Wade, supra note 26, at 502.
117. Id. at 505.
118. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, ch. 55, § 3(4).
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gift, she could not qualify as a measuring life.119 If the mother outlived
the proper measuring lives by twenty-one years, the English statute
would invalidate the gift. 120
The hypothetical testator was only trying to restrict the estate during
lives in being at the time of the gift. The statutory list approach thus
invalidates a gift that would vest within the perpetuities period because
of the administrative burden of recognizing the spouse as a measuring
life.121
Statutory lists provide a simple, efficient solution to the measuring
life problem. In a small number of cases, however, this approach will
provide inappropriate results.
C. Causal Lives Formulae
The wait-and-see provisions of Ontario,"2 Kentucky, 123 and Wash-
ington1 24 define the measuring lives by specific formulae. These stat-
utes attempt to restrict the permissible measuring lives to those that
would have qualified as causal lives at common law.
The Washington statute, applicable only to trusts, defines the perpe-
tuities period as twenty-one years added to those lives for which, by the
terms of the indenture, the trust is to continue. 25  If the trust instru-
ment's terms provide that the trust is to continue only for a portion of a
life in being, only that portion is included in the perpetuities period.' 2 6
119. Morris & Wade, supra note 26, at 505.
120. The requirement that the beneficiaries survive the mother renders their interest contin-
gent until the death of the mother. Therefore, if the mother does not die within 21 years of the
proper measuring life, the interests will actually vest beyond the time permitted.
121. But see In re Frank, 480 Pa. 116, 389 A.2d 536 (1978). In Frank the testator created a
trust that was to terminate upon the death or remarriage of the testator's daughter-in-law. One
Mary K. Frank married into the family after the execution of the trust. The court found no
perpetuities violation:
Under the actual events test, Mary K. Frank was a life in being when testator created the
trust. No interest can vest later than twenty-one years past her life because the last inter-
ests to vest do so upon either her death or remarriage. Thus, construction of the trust's
termination clause to include Mary K. Frank as a "daughter in law" presents no viola-
tion of the rule against perpetuities.
Id. at 125, 389 A.2d at 541.
122. Ontario Perpetuities Act, 1966, [1970] REv. STAT. ONT. ch. 343.
123. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Baldwin 1979).
124. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.010 (1967).
125. The statute provides for a perpetuities period of twenty-one years plus "[tihe period mea-
sured by any life or lives in being or conceived at the effective date of the instrument if by the
terms of the instrument the trust is to continue for such life or lives." Id. § 11.98.010(2).
126. Id. § 11.98.010(3).
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Construed literally, this provision is far too narrow. Even the com-
mon law did not require that the validating lives be mentioned in the
instrument which created the future interest.127 By adding this require-
ment, the Washington statute precludes appropriate measuring lives.
Consider a devise to the testator's grandchildren who attain the age of
twenty-five. If the trust instrument fails to expressly provide that the
trust is to continue during the lives of the testator's children, then those
children are not measuring lives. The Washington statute thus exalts
draftsmanship over substance.
The Kentucky statute provides that the perpetuities period may in-
clude only lives having a causal relationship to the vesting or failing of
the interest.128 The statute's author has argued that in almost all cases,
the provision will limit the permissible measuring lives to preceding life
tenants, beneficiaries, parents of beneficiaries, explicitly designated
measuring lives, or others whose activities or death will affect the
vesting. 129
The Kentucky statute attempts to limit the wait-and-see measuring
lives to those which would have qualified as causal lives at common
law and is therefore consistent with the policies underlying the perpetu-
ities period. 30 If the courts construe it properly, the statute will allow
the donor control only through the existing generation and the minority
of the succeeding generations. Commentators, however, have criticized
the Kentucky provision for its ambiguity. They have expressed dissat-
isfaction with the test of a "causal relationship to vesting.' 31 In a gift
to the first child of A to become a member of the bar,, are the members
127. See B.M.C. Durfee Trust Co. v. Taylor, 325 Mass. 201, 205, 89 N.E.2d 777, 779 (1950);
Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 356, 362, 140 So.2d 843, 848 (1962); Lux v. Lux, 109 R.I. 592, 598-99,
288 A.2d 701, 705 (1972). See generally W. BuRBY, supra note 2, at 414; J. GRAY, supra note 1, at§ 219.2 n.2; R. LYN, supra note 18, at 43; 5 R. POWELL, supra note 1, at 76614J; L. SIMaS, supra
note 1, at § 1223; Leach & Logan, supra note 1, at § 24.13.
128. The Kentucky provision provides that: "Mhe period shall not be measured by any lives
whose continuance does not have a causal relationship to the vesting or failure of the interest."
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Baldwin 1979).
129. In practically all cases the measuring lives will be one or more of the following as fits
the particular facts: (a) the preceding life tenant, (b) the taker of the interest,
(c) parents of the takers of the interest, (d) a person designated as a measuring life in the
instrument, or (e) some other person whose action or death can expressly or by implica.
tion cause the interest to vest or fail.
Dukeminier, supra note 18, at 63.
130. See notes 56-79 supra and accompanying text.
131. See Allen, supra note 27, at 112-14; Maudsley, supra note 18, at 375-76; Note, Peretullies
Reform, Approaches andReproaches, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 611, 616-18 (1974).
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of the Board of Bar Examiners sufficiently related? 32 They have a di-
rect relationship to the vesting contingency; a child's passing the bar.
Whose lives are causally related to a gift to 4, postponed until the pro-
bate of the testator's will?' 33
The Kentucky statute may also exclude appropriate measuring lives.
Consider a devise to the testator's first grandchild to marry. 134 The rule
should validate this gift if the grandchild marries before the age of
twenty-one. 35 The testator's children, however, are only tangentially
related to the vesting condition of the grandchild's marriage. 13 6 If the
statute excludes the testator's children as measuring lives, the gift will
probably fail, regardless of when the grandchild marries. 37
The Ontario formula approach 3 1 may avoid the ambiguity of the
Kentucky statute. The Ontario formula allows as measuring lives those
lives that, at the time the interest is created, limit or are relevant in
limiting the period in which the interest may vest. 139 Prior commenta-
ries have treated the Ontario and Kentucky statutes as interchangeable;
viewing the Ontario provision as subject to the same criticisms as the
Kentucky statute."4 The focus of the Ontario statute, however, is on
the relevance of a particular life to a limitation on vesting, rather than
vesting itself.'4 ' This change provides for greater clarity in identifying
the appropriate measuring lives. Thus, in a gift to the first child ofA to
become a member of the bar, 42 the bar examiners are clearly not mea-
suring lives. Their lives do not limit the time in which the interest
132. See Allen, supra note 27, at 113.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 112-13.
135. If the grandchild does marry before the age of 21, the testator will only have postponed
vesting through the generation with which he is familiar and the minority of the succeeding
generation.
136. Allen, supra note 27, at 114.
137. If the children are not measuring lives, the marriage would have to take place within 21
years of the death of some other valid measuring life, probably the testator's.
138. Ontario Perpetuities Act, 1966, [1970] REv. STAT. Or. ch. 343.
139. The statute provides: "[N]o life shall be included [as a measuring life] other than that of
any person whose life, at the time the interest was created, limits or is a relevant factor that limits
in some way the period within which the conditions for vesting of the interest may occur." Id. at
§ 6.
140. See Allen, supra note 27, at 112-14; Maudsley, supra note 18, at 375-76. See also Oos-
terhoff & Cudmore, Problems in Ascertaining Lives in Being Under Ontario's Ferpetuities Act (on
limiting lives and relevant factors), 4 EsT. & TR Q. 119 (1978).
141. See note 139 supra and accompanying text.
142. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
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could vest. Similarly, in the devise to the testator's first grandchild to
marry,143 the testator's children are measuring lives. They limit the
time in which the testator's grandchildren can be born, and therefore
the time in which the vesting contingency, the grandchild's marriage,
can occur.
The formula approach adopted by Kentucky and Ontario provides
measuring lives consistent with the policies underlying the rule's perpe-
tuities period.144 If the Kentucky statute is overly ambiguous, the On-
tario provision is not. The formula approach, however, may not
provide the clarity and administrative efficiency of the statutory list
approach. 145
V. CONCLUSION
Any legislature attempting to formulate a wait-and-see version of the
rule against perpetuities should pay careful attention to the measuring
life problem. Wait-and-see alters the basic structure of the rule. The
system of lives that operated at common law will not suffice under
wait-and-see. 146
The statutes incorporating wait-and-see should address directly the
measuring life problem. The measuring life selection goes to the heart
of the rule's restriction on remote vesting. 147 Moreover, judicial con-
struction of the measuring life concept has proven inadequate. 148
The legislature should choose the measuring lives with sensitivity to
the policies underlying the rule's restriction on remote vesting. The
measuring lives selected should allow the donor to control the property
through the existing generation and the minority of the next
generation. 149
The legislature should choose a statutory list if clarity and adminis-
trative efficiency are the paramount concerns. This approach, however,
may produce undesirable results in a small number of cases. 5 '
A well drafted causal lives formula is potentially the best method of
143. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
144. See notes 56-78 & 128-43 supra and accompanying text.
145. See notes 108-09 supra and accompanying text.
146. See notes 28-55 supra and accompanying text.
147. See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
148. See notes 85-96 supra and accompanying text.
149. See notes 56-79 supra and accompanying text.
150. See notes 110-21 supra and accompanying text.
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identifying appropriate measuring lives. Although more complex than
the statutory list, the formula approach consistently provides measur-
ing lives that are appropriate in light of the policy of regulating re-
motely vesting interests embodied in the rule against perpetuities.
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